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ABSTRACT 
This article makes a theoretical contribution to the constructivist and cultural political 
economy literatures on crisis. While these new approaches have highlighted the 
imaginary dimensions of crisis, they have neglected the specifically historical forms of 
imagination through which events are construed and constructed as crises. In 
particular, they have yet to adequately theorise how the recollection of prior crises 
might interact with efforts to diagnose and resolve a crisis in some later present. I 
respond to this lacuna by developing a novel set of tools for analysing the meta-
historical dimensions of crisis. These include a typology that identifies three distinct 
ways of recalling past crises, and a concept of ‘history-production’, which captures 
how different interpretive practices feed into the diagnosis and negotiation of crisis 
episodes. Taken together these tools help illuminate a complex interaction not only 
between historical analogies, narratives, and lessons, but also between these 
representational modes and the imaginary dimensions of crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Episodes of rupture and transformation are grist for the mill of IPE scholarship.1 This 
reflects a longstanding intuition that such ‘crisis’ episodes provide a window through 
which to glimpse the nature of both transnational order and change. Yet where early 
IPE scholars saw in crises the expression of objective forces and limits, contemporary 
theorists now also see the work of subjective interventions and historical myths, 
projections, or fictions (see Hall, 2003; Allon, 2009; Brassett and Clarke, 2012; 
Broome et al., 2012; Carstensen, 2013; Siles-Brügge, 2014). This shift reflects the 
recent import of linguistic, semiotic, and social theory into IPE. With the rise of 
constructivist and cultural political economy, it has become a commonplace to ask 
how the very portrayal of an event as a ‘crisis’ can determine the kind of turning point 
it will become (Hay, 1999; 2011; Blyth, 2002; Widmaier et al., 2007; Jessop, 2004; 
2012). In this article I seek to further develop such approaches by foregrounding the 
role of distinctly historical forms of imagination. More concretely, I identify a number 
of ways in which the recollection of past crises can partake in the discursive 
production and negotiation of later crisis episodes. 
This point of focus is derived from a critique of the ‘new crisis theory’ and its 
relation to a longer history of crisis thinking within the human sciences. As Reinhart 
Koselleck (2006: 373-5) points out, the modern concept of crisis is a means of 
exercising the historical imagination – it is a tool that theorists use to give shape or 
figure to history. The new crisis theorists redouble this wager by imagining crises as 
events that agents themselves take to be turning points within history. But if crisis 
episodes are what agents imagine them to be, then through what means do agents 
exercise their historical imagination? If the historical record provides agents with a 
repertoire of prior crisis episodes, then how do these imagined pasts shape 
contemporary efforts to diagnose and negotiate apparent crises? Recent advances in 
cultural political economy suggest an awareness of this question (Sum and Jessop, 
                                                
1 This article has benefited from conversations with David Bailey, Nina Boy, André Broome, 
Christian de Cock, Marieke de Goede, Martijn Konings, Andreas Langenohl, Ronen Palan, 
Elke Schwarz, and Ute Tellmann. I would like to thank them for their time and insight. I 
would also like to thank the RIPE editors and three anonymous reviewers for their 
challenging but constructive criticism. 
  
 
2013: 395-439), but the reflexivity of historical imagination remains a dimension of 
crisis that theory has yet to fully explore. 
I address this by developing a novel set of tools for crisis theorising in IPE. The 
first of these is a distinction between the function that a past crisis might perform within 
a later present, and the specific practices of historical representation through which that 
past crisis finds a determinate form. The second is a typology of three basic varieties of 
historical representation, which correspond to those produced through practices of 
analogical reasoning, narrativisation, and lesson drawing. The third tool is a concept of history-
production, which captures how these varieties of representational practice can be 
combined to either constitute or help negotiate the historicity of a crisis in the present. 
Taken together these points highlight a complex interaction not only between 
historical analogies, narratives, and lessons, but also between these representational 
modes and the kinds of functions they can perform within a context of apparent crisis. 
It is this nexus that should form the basis for future crisis theorising within the 
constructivist and cultural political economy traditions. 
I develop this argument over five sections. In the first I unpack the temporal 
and historical ambiguities implicit in the notion of crisis. I then locate these 
ambiguities within modern political economy and its various branches of crisis theory. 
After this I identify questions of historical imagination as an underdeveloped 
component of the new crisis theory, and introduce the analytical tools described above. 
Finally, I use a series of examples to illustrate the real-world significance of my 
argument, and also offer some broader reflections on its implications for the status of 
history within IPE scholarship. 
 
AMBIGUITIES OF CRISIS IN THEORY 
 
In what way does ‘crisis’ provide a means of exercising the historical imagination? For 
Koselleck an answer is already written into the history of crisis thinking. In this section 
I reconstruct Koselleck’s argument, paying particular attention to how the ambiguities 
of the crisis idea give scope to the historical imagination of the crisis theorist. I begin 
with an etymology of the term and a brief survey of its uses in Ancient Greece. I then 
indicate how the foundational ambiguities of the term are multiplied through its 
transformation into a modern historical concept. 
  
 
Early meanings and uses of ‘crisis’ 
 
When we talk about crisis we already reveal a fundamental ambiguity in terms of its 
meaning. In everyday usage, the word is used to indicate a mixture of danger, 
uncertainty, and the compulsion to act. This can be traced back to the Greek term 
krisis, which is derived from the verb krinō – meaning “to cut, to select, to decide, to 
judge; [and] by extension, to measure, to quarrel, to fight” (Koselleck, 2002: 237). 
The word itself therefore brings with it a double meaning, for it refers not only to the 
simple need for a ‘decision’, but also to the ‘measuring’ and ‘quarrelling’ through 
which such a decision might be reached.  
As Koselleck (2006: 359) points out, this apparent two-sidedness is in fact a 
foundational unity, reflecting how modern ideas of subjective critique and objective 
crisis were still “conceptually fused” under the Greek notion of krisis. On the basis of 
their subsequent separation within European thought, however, it is possible to use 
these two domains of meaning as a tool for distinguishing between the basic analytical 
strategies of different crisis theories. Thus, while a given theory of crisis might focus on 
the objective conditions that constitute a danger and create the compulsion to act, another 
might stress the subjective interventions involved in overcoming uncertainty and enabling 
action (Koselleck, 2002: 237-47; 2006: 358-61; see also Starn, 1971: 3-5). 
Alternatively, and in keeping with the etymology of the term, a theory of crisis might 
instead seek to somehow grasp together these two phenomena (O’Connor, 1987: 145-
9). These stylised vantage points are summarised in the table below. 
 
Analytical focus Phenomena of interest 
Objective   Observable conditions that constitute a danger and create the compulsion to act 
Subjective   Process of interpretation needed to overcome uncertainty and enable action 
Objective/Subjective   Intertwinement of conditions and their interpretation in a critical moment 
 
        Table 1. Basic varieties of crisis theory (Source: Author’s own) 
 
A further and specifically temporal ambiguity is created through early Greek 
uses of the word. If krisis connotes a critical moment or turning point within a larger 
  
 
process, then it also brings with it the notion of time passing. But because the term is 
employed within different semantic spheres, it aims to grasp a diverse range of 
processes. This diversity produces a variety of temporalities for crisis. In legal 
discourse, for example, decision means a judgment or the reaching of a verdict, and 
therefore implies a potentially endless series of discrete legal rulings. With Thucydides, 
these include decisions regarding the Greeks’ battles with the Persians, leading him to 
situate krisis within a broader rhythm of war and peace (Starn, 1971: 3-4; Koselleck, 
2002: 237). According to Aristotle, however, it is through participating in such a 
general process of passing judgment that individuals become citizens and political 
orders become just (Koselleck, 2006: 359; Aristotle, 1998: 84-97). The juridical 
meaning of the word therefore implies a linear yet nested temporality, for it yields a 
vision of governmental decision-making that simultaneously encompasses discrete 
strategic dilemmas and an ongoing process of civic participation.  
In theological circles, krisis acquires an eschatological meaning. The juridical 
sense of the word is retained, but in the ancient Greek translation of the Old and New 
Testaments, the verdict in question becomes the one that is eventually delivered by 
God (Koselleck, 2006: 359-60). As a result, it is the decisions that will have been made – 
rather than a mere ongoing or punctuated process of decision-making – which 
provide crisis with its temporal dimension. The coming Apocalypse operates through 
a “cosmic foreshortening of time” (Koselleck, 2002: 245), wherein one’s faith both 
anticipates and enacts the Last Judgment before its arrival. The early Christian usage 
of the word therefore entails a non-linear and entangled temporality, for it designates 
an ongoing experience in the present of an event that has yet to actually occur. 
In the sphere of medicine krisis takes on yet another temporality. Following its 
appearance in Hippocrates’ treatise On Affections, Greek physicians use the term to 
denote a critical point or phase in the progress of a disease (Starn, 1971: 4). As a 
deciding moment in the “battle between life and death” (Koselleck, 2002: 237), its 
temporal dimension is relatively straightforward: it marks a threshold. However, as a 
“judgment … about the course of the illness” that will ultimately determine the 
outcome of this battle (Koselleck, 2006: 360), a more complex figuration of time can 
be identified. Hippocrates himself provides a range of possibilities when he states that 
a crisis occurs “whenever … [diseases] increase in intensity or go away or change into 
another disease or end altogether” (quoted in Starn, 1971: 4). The early medical usage 
  
 
of the word therefore implies a non-linear and differentiated temporality, for in 
addition to an overarching and diachronic conception of the relationship between 
sickness and health, the word also suggests the possibility of recoveries, relapses, and 
displacements or mutations. The dimensions of krisis as they appear in each of these 
three registers is summarised in the table below. 
 
Semantic 
sphere 
Object/Subject Alternatives Frequency/Duration Directionality Temporality 
Law 
Governmental 
decision 
Right/Wrong 
Discrete points; 
Ongoing process 
Open-ended 
Linear   
(nested) 
Theology 
Spiritual 
judgment 
Salvation/ 
Damnation 
Singular event; 
Ongoing process 
Teleological 
Non-linear 
(entangled) 
Medicine 
Physiological 
threshold 
Life/Death 
Discrete points; 
Multiple durations 
Open-ended 
Non-linear 
(differentiated) 
 
    Table 2. Dimensions of ‘crisis’ in its early Greek uses (Source: Author’s own) 
 
Crisis as a modern concept 
 
The etymology of crisis and its early usage already invests the term with a wide variety 
of meanings. But as a Latinised form of the word is translated into national languages 
during the seventeenth century, these meanings provide the basis for a further 
extension of the concept into new semantic spheres (Koselleck, 2006: 361-7). The 
medical variant dominates early modern social and political thought, where it is 
applied to the notion of a ‘body politic’ and used to describe a moment of upheaval in 
either the internal or external affairs of state (pp. 362-3, 368-70). The eschatological 
aspects of its religious variant find voice in later, speculative philosophies of history, 
where ‘crisis’ figures as both an ongoing epoch and coming threshold for humankind 
(pp. 368-81). It is also in this context that a distinctly economic meaning of the term 
begins to take shape, doing so at first through a medical language of ‘convulsions’ and 
‘blockages’ (p. 389). The point, however, is not that ambiguities already implicit in the 
crisis idea are reproduced via its translation into nascent modern disciplines. Rather, it 
is that these ambiguities are multiplied as new questions about the nature of historical 
time prompt scholars to combine and redeploy some of the term’s earlier forms and 
  
 
meanings.2 The table below disaggregates the various dimensions and functions of 
‘crisis’ as a historical concept. 
 
Function Semantic origins  Definition Frequency 
Periodising concept Medical usage 
Ongoing and culminating point 
in a chain of events 
Unique; Recurring 
Epochal concept Theological usage 
Forthcoming and final point of 
transformation 
Unique 
Epochal periodising 
concept 
Combined 
Permanent or existential 
situation 
Unique; Recurring 
Epochal periodising 
concept 
Combined 
Historically immanent transition 
phase 
Unique  
 
 
      Table 3. Crisis as a modern historical concept (Source: Author’s own) 
 
Taken together, these different interpretive options produce a profound 
ambiguity regarding the nature of crisis. Once crisis becomes a properly historical 
concept, its meaning as an actual occurrence is opened up to range of seemingly 
endless possibilities. It compels a decision and thus marks a threshold, but the kinds of 
conditions or states that it provides a passage between is unclear. It can be unique or 
recurrent, specific or general, transient or final. It can be ongoing, forthcoming, or 
even both at the same time. Moreover, as a condition that must be recognised as such 
in order to properly exist, it can be any combination of these things.  
According to Koselleck it is this ambiguity that defines the term as a modern 
concept. ‘Crisis’, he argues, “becomes a structural signature of modernity” because it 
gives free scope to the historical imagination: “it takes hold of old experiences and 
transforms them metaphorically in ways that create altogether new expectations” 
(Koselleck, 2006: 374). There are other ways in which such an operation might 
performed, but it is “precisely the exciting possibility of combining so many functions” 
(p. 374) that makes the idea of crisis such an attractive one. The crisis idea can 
therefore be understood as a tool for imagining history; it is a means by which the 
                                                
2 Jacob Burckhardt provides a particularly clear illustration of this process in his 1868 
lectures on The Crises of History (1979: 213-68). 
  
 
theorist can impose pattern and rhythm onto an otherwise chaotic onslaught of 
events. 
 
HISTORY AND CRISIS IN MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
The chaos of global economic history has prompted a great deal of crisis theorising. In 
this section I identify two key trends in political economy thinking on crisis. The first is 
a move to affirm the status of crises as both historically novel and institutionally 
generated. This process begins with Karl Marx, runs through J. M. Keynes, and 
culminates in the work of the French Regulation School. The second is a growing 
interest in the path-shaping power of subjective interventions during crises. This 
emerges out of the Althusserian kernel in Regulation theory, and ultimately paves the 
way for the new constructivist and cultural political economy approaches to crisis. 
 
From exogenous shocks to endogenous tendencies 
 
The early classical economists saw the market as a natural order with laws of its own, 
but they had yet to situate economic fluctuations within these laws (Veblen, 1898: 
381-2). As a consequence, bouts of instability could not be attributed to the economic 
process itself, and instead were typically framed as acts of God or Nature. Neoclassical 
economics moves away from this language after W. S. Jevons (1878), but ‘crises’ still 
retain an extrinsic quality. With the general equilibrium framework, for example, 
questions of growth and change are formally excluded from theoretical models, 
leaving the analysis of macroeconomic trends to empirically oriented researchers (cf. 
Walras, 2003/1874; Mitchell, 1913). Economic theorists must therefore take 
macroeconomic volatility as evidence of a periodic adjustment to exogenous shocks 
(Mattick, 1981: 30-1). This move is redoubled in the real business-cycle models of the 
1970s, where fluctuations in output are now explicitly attributed to unexplained shifts 
in productivity or policy (e.g. Lucas, 1983; Hartley et al., 1998). Early neoclassical and 
later new classical visions of instability are in this way defined by the figure of the 
cycle. Such cycles are seen as properly belonging to economics, yet because the 
changes that trigger them are treated as exogenous shocks, capitalism itself is situated 
outside of history. Crisis, in turn, remains a quasi-natural occurrence. 
  
 
In order to situate both capitalism within history and crises within capitalism, 
it would take theorists willing to begin with the accumulation process. This occurs in 
Marx’s late writings via a return to David Ricardo’s vision of the ‘stationary-state’ 
economy. In Marx’s estimation Ricardo was right to question to perpetuity of profits, 
but wrong to seek an answer in the declining fertility of the land (Marx, 1973/1953: 
754). Instead, Marx argues, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall should be traced 
back to a contradiction between exchange-value and use-value production, which 
drives an overdevelopment of the productive forces (Marx, 1977/1894: 247-59). 
Broadly speaking, this account of the accumulation process yields a dual role for crisis 
within history. In the first instance there are periodic industrial crises, wherein a 
destruction of the productive forces temporarily restores profitability to the process of 
surplus-value production (pp. 251-5). But because each of these crises only serve to 
further exhaust the scope for future profits, there is also singular and final crisis that is 
still to come, after which the productive forces of social labour will once and for all be 
transformed into the basis for a higher mode of production (pp. 257-9; see also Marx 
and Engels, 1998/1848: 41-2). Marx therefore embeds the figure of the cycle within a 
specific mode of production and a more general vision of historical progress. This 
imbues crisis with a powerful new telos: rather than a random shock or disturbance, 
crises are the relentless ratchet mechanism by which capital undoes itself. 
There have been countless reformulations of Marx’s crisis theory, but for the 
most part these do little to refigure the dual role of crises within capitalist history.3 In 
the wake of the Great Depression, however, Keynes’ (1936) financial theory of under-
investment yields a new vision of the relation between cyclical and epochal crises. This 
theory is rooted in a claim about how uncertainty fuels financial instability. Keynes 
develops this through his ‘beauty contest’ analogy (p. 156), which suggests that stock 
market prices are determined by second-order expectations about prospective yields. 
When a stock-market boom goes bust, the beauty contest turns ugly and investors seek 
refuge in liquidity. This financial reversal is then deepened by a decline in the 
consumption of both traders and the ‘stock-minded public’ (p. 136), which only makes 
productive investment appear even less profitable (p. 319). Once this vicious circle 
takes hold, attempts to restore investor and consumer confidence via monetary or 
                                                
3 With underconsumptionism, for example, scholars simply identify a different motor behind 
the tendency towards terminal crisis. On the varieties of underconsumptionism and their 
critics see Bleaney (1976). 
  
 
fiscal policy may not be enough to induce a return to growth and higher levels of 
employment (pp. 375-7). Keynes therefore sees the threat of crisis as consisting less in 
the ups and downs of a business cycle, and more in the breakdown of such a cycle at 
its low point. Crucially, though, such a threat cannot be fully understood with 
reference to the capitalist mode of production in general, for it grows out of a 
historically unprecedented subordination of industrial capital to finance. As Keynes 
(1936: 320) himself says, it is only “with markets organised and influenced as they are 
at present” that uncertainty can breed permanent under-investment. The upshot, 
then, is that crises are generated through the contingent evolution of economic 
institutions (rather than any basic laws of capitalist civilisation). 
 
From objective determination to subjective interventions 
 
Despite the success of Keynes’ General Theory, it is only with a later generation of 
economists that an evolutionary institutionalism is fully brought into crisis theory. The 
early works of Michel Aglietta (1979) and Alain Lipietz (1987) are decisive in this 
regard. Writing against a backdrop of persistent stagflation, both Aglietta and Lipietz 
set out to understand the foundations of capitalist growth and stability. In order to do 
this they supplement the notion of a capitalist mode of production with the concept of 
historically specific ‘accumulation regimes’, and then argue that each of these regimes 
rely on an associated ‘mode of regulation’ for their continued reproduction. 4 
According to Lipietz (1987: 15), such a correspondence is a not “pre-ordained part of 
capitalism’s destiny”, nor even is it a product of conscious design. Its accidental 
discovery nevertheless still serves a crucial function in enabling a set of historically 
specific contradictions to be managed or “mitigated” (Aglietta, 1979: 383). 
Here the Regulationists go beyond Marx, seeking to situate capitalism itself 
within the path-dependent transformation of intra- and inter-national social relations 
(e.g. Lipietz, 1993: 117; see also Boyer, 2000). This effort brings with it two new and 
distinct figurations of crisis. On one hand, there are those that have not yet transpired 
and exist only as tendencies kept in check or ‘mitigated’ by an effective mode of 
                                                
4 An ‘accumulation regime’ refers to a sustainable pattern of investment and consumption 
within a capitalist social formation (Aglietta, 1979: 68). A ‘mode of regulation’ refers to the 
ensemble of norms and institutions that stabilise this pattern and enable its reproduction 
(Lipietz, 1987: 14).  
  
 
regulation. These crises are immanent to a social formation and in particular to its 
regime of accumulation. On the other hand, there are those crises that mark the 
dissolution of an accumulation regime and the beginning of the struggle through 
which a new one might be found. Rather than expressing either the normal 
functioning or structurally determined demise of a capitalist social formation, such 
crises are the transformative thresholds through which such formations pass and 
emerge out of qualitatively anew. That is, they are properly historical moments, 
invested with the power to create entirely new institutional modalities, 
interdependencies, and crisis-tendencies. Regulation theory therefore stresses both the 
historical novelty and the path-shaping power of crises.  
In order to do this, however, the Regulationists are forced to retreat from the 
actual event of crisis as a site for theory. This is a corollary of their attempt to work 
both within and against the thought of Louis Althusser. Following Althusser, the early 
Regulationists envision social formations as complex and overdetermined – there is no 
“general ‘contradiction’” that drives their evolution (Althusser, 1969: 100; cf. Lipietz, 
1993: 127). Yet Lipietz (1993: 120-38) is also clear that the concept of regulation is 
meant to moderate some of the more structuralist elements in Althusser’s account of 
social reproduction, and to restore a sense of agency to the process of history. The 
consequence of this double move is to relegate concrete analyses of crisis onto either 
side of their occurrence – on one side, there is the retrospective reconstruction of 
emergent contradictions within a social formation; on the other, a prospective 
identification of new and potentially stabilising complementarities between 
institutional forms and the classes that struggle on their behalf. In neither instance is 
the transformative threshold itself opened up to investigation. 
In this respect the Regulationists lag behind an older tradition of social and 
political crisis theory in Marxism, which begins with the early Marx and runs from 
Gramsci through to Poulantzas, Offe, and Habermas (see O’Connor, 1987: 108-57). 
It is with Régis Debray (1975: 87-160), however, that the phenomenology of crisis 
becomes a proper object of Marxist theory. Reflecting his own debt to Althusser, 
Debray sees the outbreak of a crisis as “objectively overdetermined” (p. 113) – a knot 
in history’s fabric of contradictory relations. He also anticipates the position that 
Lipietz would eventually adopt, arguing that such events are “epoch-making” (p. 99) 
and therefore cannot be entirely reduced to the logics that either precede or follow 
  
 
them. But rather than stopping here – that is, with the epistemic uncertainty that 
comes with the overdetermination of crisis – Debray goes a step further. “In every 
crisis situation”, he writes, “there is an interplay of darkness and clarity”:  
 
The objective conditions provide a background, a containing framework of 
propositions, which restricts the spectrum of possible initiatives or 
responses to events, but that background then seems to fade … So much 
so that the outline, the thing that can be seen by everyone, shifts from the 
objective to the subjective, the indeterminate, with the individual initiatives 
of a few characters suddenly thrust into the forefront of the stage. (Debray, 
1975: 104-5) 
 
In this visual metaphor, ‘darkness’ is the slipping away of certainty that accompanies 
the overdetermination of crisis, while ‘clarity’ is the shape given to such an event by 
those who speak out on it. Crucially, though, this latter process is as much a question 
of political praxis as it is one of theory. Try as we might to “untangle” the knot of 
crisis, what it demands is instead to be “cut” (p. 111). He continues: “We must try to 
untangle it in theory … but only so as to be able to make practical decisions … [based 
on] resolutely simple, even simplistic-seeming, formulae for action” (p. 111). Hence, it 
is only through the strategic reductionism of social agents that crises can ever be 
envisioned and resolved in one way rather than another.  
Debray may be a marginal figure in conventional histories of crisis thinking, 
but within political economy he marks the confluence of two key trajectories. 
Following the lead of Marx and Keynes, he affirms both the historical novelty and 
path-shaping power of crises. Yet he also explicitly recovers the unity of subject and 
object inherent in the Greek notion of krisis, enabling him to ask how accounts of 
‘crisis’ feed into the very processes they purport to explain. By making both of these 
moves at once, Debray profoundly refigures the relation between history and crisis. 
Put simply: It is through the subjective interventions they elicit that crises find their 
novel place with history. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
HISTORICAL IMAGINATION AND THE NEW CRISIS THEORY 
 
Since the 1980s there have been a range of further developments in crisis theory.5 
Here I focus on the new constructivist and cultural political economy approaches 
developed by Colin Hay, Mark Blyth, and Bob Jessop (hereafter referred to as the 
‘new crisis theory’). In these approaches, the resolution of a crisis situation is seen to 
hinge on the way in which social agents interpret it. But rather than providing a guide 
for political praxis, the new crisis theory aims to turn interpretive struggle itself into 
the object of crisis theorising. The result is to radically foreground the ambiguities of 
crisis, for if crises are at least in part what agents make of them, then it is to the 
historical imagination of said agents that the theorist must turn in order to situate 
crises within history. 
 
Crises are what agents make of them 
 
The new crisis theory emerges through the cultural and institutional turns in political 
economy. These draw in varying degrees from older Marxist and Keynesian concerns 
regarding the power of ‘ideas’ over processes of social reproduction and structural 
change. As a result, there are important differences in terms of both how and where 
the new crisis theory takes shape. All three of its major branches nevertheless stress the 
fundamental intersubjectivity of crisis. 
The first of these branches is associated with the work of Colin Hay. Though 
now framed a broader approach to institutional analysis, Hay’s early research is a 
more or less direct response to the Althusserian moment in Marxist crisis theory. In 
particular, Hay (1996; 1999) takes up the question of how structural change might 
emerge from a situation characterised by subjective indeterminacy. His core 
contribution in this regard is to emphasise the role of narration in the discursive 
construction of crisis. There are a number of steps in his argument. Following Debray, 
Hay (1999: 323-7) conceives of crises as both overdetermined and indeterminate – 
overdetermined, because there are always too many contradictions behind the 
                                                
5 The most recent among these is a return to heterodox theories of money and finance (e.g. 
Lapavitsas, 2009; Nesvetailova, 2010; Lucarelli, 2011). There has also been a steady stream of 
further advances in the Regulation approach, both within and beyond the original Parisian 
school (cf. Overbeek, 2004; Palan, 2006; Boyer, 2013). 
  
 
breakdown of an accumulation regime; and indeterminate, because there is never any 
certainty about which diagnosis will prove to be path-shaping. Hay’s response is to 
posit narration as a kind of a median level between these two registers. Before a crisis 
can be said to exist, contradictions must be discursively recruited as “symptoms” and 
incorporated into a “meta-narrative of crisis” (pp. 333-5). But once such a meta-
narrative does emerge, it opens up an space of struggle between itself and other 
competing narratives, mapping-out a “discursively selective terrain” that privileges 
some narratives of crisis over others (1996: 261). Crucially, though, this process of 
narrative competition is itself indeterminate, for just as contradictions can be recruited 
as symptoms of systemic failure, so too can they be discursively negotiated in ways that 
absolve that same system from blame (Hay, 2011: 2-3). Hence, in what Hay (2006) 
would eventually term ‘constructivist institutionalism’, structural change is a non-
necessary response to systemic failure, and its eventuation is contingent upon the 
public narration of that failure as a ‘crisis’ of pre-existing structures. 
A similar line of analysis is also taken up under the banner of ‘agent-centred’ 
or ‘uncertainty-based’ constructivism (Widmaier et al., 2007: 752-3; Abdelal et al., 
2010: 11-3). The central claim of these constructivists is that agents need simplifying 
ideas in order to overcome the uncertainty that comes with crisis. There are echoes of 
Debray in this formulation, but here the nature of uncertainty is somewhat different. 
Rather than a corollary of overdetermination per se, uncertainty instead specifies the 
inability of agents to derive their interests from existing economic structures. One of 
the first to develop this argument is Mark Blyth (2002), who does so via the notion of 
‘Knightian uncertainty’ (pp. 8-10, 30-4). During periods of economic disorder, Blyth 
argues, agents become “unsure as to what their interests are, let alone how to realize 
them” (p. 8). But because purposive action requires both means and ends, agents need 
some kind of mechanism for overcoming uncertainty if they are to ever respond to it. 
Enter ideas. For Blyth it is the “ideas that agents themselves have about the causes of 
uncertainty” that enable them to identify goals and formulate strategies (p. 32). 
Moreover, it is through the attempts agents make to impose their ideas on others that 
collective or institutional responses to ‘crisis’ take shape (pp. 32-45). Business and 
policy elites might wage wars in the name of their various “crisis-defining ideas” (Blyth, 
2007: 761), and these inter-elite debates may themselves be held to account by 
“everyday discourses constructed by mass public agents” (Seabrooke, 2007: 795). In 
  
 
both instances, however, processes of interpretation and persuasion are integral to the 
dynamics of crisis. This vision of the crisis situation yields a double-function for the 
concept of crisis. ‘Crisis’ designates an event that agents “interpret as necessitating 
change” (Widmaier et al., 2007: 748), but at the same time, it also entails the 
“processes of persuasion” that such events ignite, and which ultimately determine the 
very nature of the change they produce (p. 749). 
More recently, Bob Jessop has sought to develop a theory of crisis by situating 
Hay’s notion of ‘discursive selectivity’ alongside his own notion of ‘structural 
selectivity’ (Jessop, 2007: 21-79). Jessop develops these concepts within the context of 
his ‘strategic-relational approach’ to state theory, but both have now assumed a 
central place within the broader ‘cultural political economy’ framework he is 
developing with Ngai-Ling Sum (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 48-54). This framework 
defies simple summary, but within the context of the present discussion there are three 
key points that deserve emphasis. The first is that Gramsci’s account of hegemonic 
leadership provides a class-basis for the subjective interventions that crises elicit 
(Jessop, 2004: 166-70; Sum and Jessop, 2013: 72-90). This is implicit in Debray, 
increasingly less visible in Hay, and more or less absent in Blyth. The second is that 
the subjective indeterminacy of crisis is understood through the lens of complexity and 
systems theory (Jessop, 2007: 225-45). Specifically, Jessop (2004: 162-3) argues that 
the reproduction of an accumulation regime is always dependent on complexity-
reducing imaginaries, which are what enable a subset of economic activities to be 
identified as an object of intervention or management. Once the contradictions that 
these and other activities produce are construed as symptoms of systemic crisis, efforts 
at complexity-reduction lose their unity and there is a proliferation of competing 
imaginaries (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 404). The indeterminacy of crisis therefore stems 
not from overdetermination or complexity itself, but from the multiplicity of ways in 
which complexity might be reduced. Finally, the third point is that the eventual 
diagnosis and resolution of a crisis episode is seen to hinge on the emergence of a 
“master economic imaginary” (Jessop, 2008: 83-4), whose role is to coordinate and 
lend structural coherence to the visions and strategies of key economic agents. This 
occurs through evolutionary mechanisms of selection and retention, which each 
possess both semiotic and material dimensions (Jessop, 2004: 164-5; Sum and Jessop, 
2013: 405). Crises are therefore periods of hegemonic struggle. During such periods, 
  
 
agents vie to remake social relations from within, and imagined economies serve in 
equal parts as weapons and bridges in this process. 
 
Crisis-histories feed on crisis-histories 
 
The intersubjectivity of crisis opens out onto and empowers what Koselleck terms the 
‘historical imagination’. In order for a crisis to even exist, let alone be managed or 
resolved, the present must be situated in relation to prior events and processes. A 
crisis-history must be articulated. This much is implied in various appeals to the 
function of narration or storytelling, which provide the basic form for subjective 
interventions during crisis (see Hay, 1999: 333; Blyth, 2007: 762; Jessop, 2008: 83). 
But if subjective interventions can produce new crisis-histories, they may also be the 
product of prior ones. That is, crises might take shape through returns to the historical 
record – and in particular, to its inventory of other, apparently similar or affiliated 
crisis episodes. This idea that there is a practical function for the past has not been lost 
on those more ‘literary’ theorists of history (e.g. White, 2010; see Samman, 2014). The 
new theorists of crisis, however, have alluded to it only in passing. 
In his landmark article on the crisis of the 1970s, Hay (1996: 253) begins by 
observing how “The winter of discontent continues to exert a powerful hold over the 
British political imaginary”. By way of elaboration he offers the following: 
 
It acts as a discursive key to a collective mythology seemingly appealed to, 
and conjured, in each wave of industrial unrest, in each hint of political 
turmoil and, until recently, whenever the election of a Labour government 
looked credible. (Hay, 1996: 253) 
 
These are insightful but nebulous comments. In one respect, Hay usefully draws 
attention to how an event from the past can live on in one of its narrative 
representations. And yet at the same time, it is not immediately clear how a past crisis 
is ‘conjured’, nor is it obvious why such a conjuring must always be in the service of a 
pre-constituted narrative rendered as historical myth. By conflating the function of the 
past with the practice of its recollection in this way, Hay is able to provide analytical 
clarity on neither. 
The proponents of agent-centred or uncertainty constructivism have 
approached the question somewhat differently. In their co-authored editorial on the 
  
 
endogenous construction of crisis, Widmaier et al. (2007: 755) highlight “the 
importance of expressive struggles over the ‘lessons of history’”. In so doing, they go 
some way towards to addressing Hay’s shortcomings. First, by acknowledging how 
“intensified debate over the meaning of contemporary events often fosters 
reinterpretations of past wars and crises” (p. 755), they challenge the idea that appeals 
to a past crisis must necessarily involve a reiteration of its prior meanings. Past crises 
can acquire new meanings in a later present. 
The uncertainty constructivists also offer some explicit comments on the 
function and status of the recollected past. According to Widmaier et al. (2007: 755-6), 
history matters because its lessons are “constitutive of future understandings and 
interests”. But because crises can be always reinterpreted, history can always provide 
new lessons. The construction of crises therefore involves a process of “ongoing 
persuasion” (p. 756), wherein agents seek to learn and teach lessons drawn from 
different crisis-histories. This is an important clarification vis-à-vis Hay, but a certain 
degree of ambiguity still remains. Most notably, Widmaier et al. are silent on the 
interpretive practices through which ‘lessons of history’ are drawn and contested. 
Agents no doubt require such practices, yet they do not appear in the analysis beyond 
an allusion to ‘expressive struggles’ between parties. This is because the category of 
‘lessons’ is defined only on the basis of its broad function – i.e., to constitute the 
‘understandings and interests’ of agents in the face of crisis.  
Cultural political economy is by far the clearest on what we might term the 
meta-historical dimensions of crisis. According to Jessop and Sum (2013: 408-15), 
‘lessons from the past’ are invoked in the course of learning in, about, and from crisis. 
By explicitly framing the question of history in terms of learning, Jessop and Sum are 
able to overcome the conflation of function and practice that marks constructivist 
crisis theory. On the side of practice, learning from the past entails an “effort to define 
appropriate historical parallels” (p. 415). On the side of function, its purpose is to 
provide “a basis for responding effectively to … crisis in real time” (p. 415). But in 
coupling together function and practice through learning, Jessop arrives at a limited 
conception of each. Lesson drawing clearly relies on finding similarities between crisis 
episodes, but the ‘effort to define appropriate parallels’ must entail more than the 
parallels themselves. Conversely, it seems unduly restrictive to treat these other kinds 
of apparent affiliations as always and only subordinate components in a broader 
  
 
process of learning. Hence, while constructivism suffers from a failure to distinguish 
between the form and the content of historical representation, cultural political 
economy is limited by too narrow a conception of the latter. 
 
ENGAGING THE META-HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF CRISIS 
 
What, then, do we do when we talk about past crises? How do our appeals to a history 
of crisis interact with efforts to diagnose or negotiate a crisis in the present? Answering 
these questions will require a set of analytical and conceptual tools that the new crisis 
theory has yet to provide. Most fundamentally, the practice through which a historical 
representation is produced must be distinguished from the functions it is able to 
perform. This is because representations of past crises must first be produced before 
they can go on to influence the diagnosis or negotiation of another, later crisis episode. 
Yet these functions must also be theorised through reference to the interpretive 
practices on which they depend, for specific forms of historical representation do carry 
different contents. In this section I identify three basic varieties of historical 
representation, and then use these to indicate how past crises can partake in a meta-
historical process of ‘history-production’. 
 
Recollecting past crises: Three varieties of historical representation 
 
To begin with practice is to begin with the question of how crises might be recalled or 
recollected within a later present. In response it is possible to identify three basic 
varieties of historical representation, each of which relies on a distinct kind of 
interpretive procedure. The most obvious of these are those representations that stress 
similarities or differences between crisis episodes. Such representations rely on a 
procedure of analogical reasoning, which consists in drawing analogies or counter-
analogies between crises. The simplest analogies provide comparisons between ‘point-
like’ aspects of crises, or otherwise seemingly self-evident processes of development. 
This is a resemblance forged between elements or dimensions of crisis episodes, rather 
than their episodic character as such. Analogies that deal in the episodic character of 
crises work instead through comparisons between causal-chains of events. This is a 
  
 
more complex form of analogical reasoning, but at its root it too rests on an 
identification of similarities and differences between crises. 
A second and perhaps more primary form of historical representation is 
narrative. Representation of this kind relies on a procedure of narrativisation, which 
imposes a story order on history through the selection, sequencing, and configuration 
of more than one of its events (White, 1987: 23-5, 44-6, 66-8). Such a procedure is 
implicit in existing appeals to the power of narrative within the new crisis theory. Here, 
however, it explicitly denotes a ‘grasping together’ of events that does not conform to 
the logic of comparison. The logic is narrativisation is therefore one of affiliation 
rather than mere resemblance. Through its imposition of a story order onto history, 
narrativisation enables past crises to be apperceived as belonging to a process that 
culminates in a later, crisis-ridden present. 
Finally, there are those representations that purport to reveal the ‘lessons of 
history’. These rely on a procedure of lesson drawing that simultaneously entails those of 
analogical reasoning and narrativisation. The relation between lesson drawing and 
narrativisation is relatively straightforward: in order to draw a lesson from a past crisis, 
one must first develop a causal story for that past crisis. But in order for this crisis 
narrative to provide a lesson for contemporary agents a further operation is required. 
Specifically, the causal-chain that is constructed around a past crisis must be 
transposed into the time of the present. Such a transposition operates on the basis of 
analogical reasoning, for it is an apparent similarity between two crises that enables 
‘lessons’ deduced from one to be deemed applicable in the other. Lesson drawing 
therefore encompasses the procedures of both narrativisation and analogical 
reasoning, while at the same remaining distinct from each in terms of the kind of 
historical representations it is able to yield.  
 
Interpretive procedure Formal properties 
Analogical reasoning   Comparison between ‘point-like’ aspects of events or narrated causal-chains 
Narrativisation   Selection, sequencing, and configuration of two or more events 
Lesson drawing   Transposition of narrated causal-chain from one present into another 
 
        Table 4. Three varieties of historical representation (Source: Author’s own) 
  
 
The above typology shows how past crises can be recollected in different ways. 
Historical analogies, narratives, and lessons may well be intertwined, but each relies 
on a distinct set of interpretive procedures. These seemingly formal differences are 
glossed over in vague appeals to the productive power of our debates over the past. 
Such debates clearly do involve “the use of history to make history” (Jessop and Sum, 
2013: 415), but in order for a history to be ‘used’ it must first be produced, in one way 
or another. The question of function must therefore be routed through the question of 
practice; to understand how histories of crisis might be used to ‘make history’ we must 
ask ourselves how agents produce their crisis-histories. 
 
Producing crisis-histories: Three modes of history-production 
 
What does it mean to posit histories of crisis, capitalist or otherwise, as an input into 
the crises of economic history? Simply put, it means taking an exercise of the historical 
imagination as one of our primary tools for confronting the uncertainty characteristic 
of ‘crisis’. In theoretical terms this intuition can be further developed through the 
concept of history-production. With history-production, ‘using history’ and ‘making 
history’ are grasped together – that is, the subjective interventions through which past 
crises are recollected, patterned, and deployed are situated in relation to the discursive 
production and negotiation of crisis in some later present. In what follows I use the 
above typology to identify three different modes of history-production. The 
disaggregation is strictly analytical in character, but by treating each variety of 
historical representation in turn important clarifications are offered regarding the 
possible functions of the past during crisis. 
For purposes of clarity in exposition I begin with history-production via 
narrativisation. Narrativisation gives figure to a sequence of events, and it can produce 
either linear or cyclical narratives of crisis. Linear narratives cast crises as the 
outcomes of novel developmental processes, whereas cyclical ones render them as 
inversions or tipping points within recurrent patterns of development. One possible 
function for each of these crisis-narrative types is to form the basis for lessons about 
how to respond to crises, whether in real-time or some unspecified future. We will 
return to this in our discussion of history-production via lesson drawing. But in order 
to form the basis for such lessons, crisis narratives must first deliver events over to 
  
 
history in one way or another. This is the fundamental function of a crisis narrative: to 
lend a semblance of order to history. By relaying the present as a crisis episode, 
narrativisation renders that present intelligible (even if in traumatic terms). For 
example, the subprime ‘crisis’ may be grasped as a crisis of debt-based accumulation, 
rather than an inexplicable breakdown of global financial and banking systems.  
This operation cuts both ways, though, because contending narratives can 
deliver events over to different, contradictory crisis-histories. Was the subprime ‘crisis’ 
an epochal crisis of capitalism, or merely another iteration in an eternal cycle of boom 
and bust? Crisis narratives both ask and answer this kind of question. In so doing, they 
reveal how the function of narrativisation during crisis is two-sided: crisis narratives 
are a means of constituting and contesting the very historicity of a present. These 
processes are history-producing because they provide an anchor for bouts of 
deliberation and struggle over crisis response. 
A second and related mode of history-production is that which operates 
through analogical reasoning. Analogical reasoning works to identify similarities or 
differences between ‘crises’, and as we have seen, it is implicated in both lesson 
drawing and certain forms of narrativisation. But as a mode of history-production, it 
performs a specific function in relation to each of these other procedures. On the side 
of narrativisation, analogical reasoning works to identify which past crises are legitimate 
subjects for narratives of recurrence. The logic here is relatively straightforward: 
before some turmoil in the present can be relayed as a familiar and recurrent form of 
crisis, similarities between the two episodes must be identified. These similarities can 
be forged in terms of the specific ‘point-like’ elements of crises, or in terms of their 
imputed developmental aspects. Analogical reasoning can in this way serve as a direct 
input into history-production via narrativisation.  
But if narratives of recurrence rely on analogical reasoning, then they also 
stand or fall on the credibility of their underlying historical analogies. Analogical 
reasoning therefore performs an additional function in relation to narrativisation, 
which is to adjudicate between competing narratives of recurrence. Again the logic is 
intuitive: once a parallel that is forged between two crises is contested, then any 
narrative that this similarity underpins is thrown into question. This has important 
implications for lesson drawing. Specifically, if the parallel upon which a cyclical 
narrativisation of crisis relies is undermined, then the lessons drawn from that 
  
 
narrative come to appear as inappropriate guides for present action. The practice of 
analogical reasoning therefore not only supports the function of narrativisation, but 
also intermediates between this and the ones performed by lesson drawing. It is to 
these latter functions that I now turn. 
As an interpretive procedure, lesson drawing hinges on the transposition of a 
crisis narrative from one present into another. This transposition is history-producing 
because it enables causal claims or inferences to travel between different presents. It is 
in this way that accounts of the past can become a source of practical guidance, 
counsel, or direction. When transposed from past into present, crisis narratives 
provide a means of attaching consequences to potential courses of action. From such 
speculated or projected consequences lessons can be then be drawn about how to 
negotiate the dilemmas posed by a crisis in the present. This is what Jessop and Sum 
(2013: 415) mean when they say that past crises can serve as “a basis for responding 
effectively to the crisis in real time”. Lesson drawing can therefore be understood as a 
process whose function is to aid the negotiation of a historicity already constituted 
through prior procedures of narrativisation and analogical reasoning.  
However, lesson drawing can have other history-producing effects via its own 
peculiar narrativity. Lessons are not narratives per se, but lessons drawn from past 
crises themselves constitute a hanging or unfinished plot, whose completion hinges on 
an invitation to learn the lesson. This invitation has different implications depending 
on the mode of narrativisation upon which the lesson is premised. In the case of 
lessons derived from narratives of recurrence, the operative analogy necessarily opens 
out onto a wider range of family resemblances. Once an apparent crisis is construed as 
‘another balance-sheet recession’, for example, lessons can then be drawn from any 
past episode already seen as belonging to this basic category. Lesson drawing 
therefore opens out onto a repertoire of prior crisis narratives and their associated 
lessons.  
Conversely, when lessons are derived from a linear narrative of crisis, the 
emphasis on historical novelty means that the invitation is to learn a fundamentally 
new lesson. Such lessons can serve as the basis for responding to a crisis in real-time, 
but they can serve as preparation for the negotiation of a crisis in another, later 
present. Lesson drawing can also therefore be the means by which an existing 
repertoire of lessons is added to or expanded. Rather than an anchor, then, lesson 
  
 
drawing provides a kind of compass with which to navigate new and uncharted 
historical territories, be these of the present or some still distant future. 
 
Interpretive 
procedure 
Formal outputs Possible functions 
Narrativisation 
Affiliations 
Between two or more 
events 
Constitute the present as an episode of crisis 
Contest the kind of crisis a present is constituted as  
Analogical 
reasoning 
Similarities or differences 
Between events or 
processes 
Identify which past crises are legitimate subjects for 
narratives of recurrence 
Adjudicate between competing narratives of recurrence 
Lesson drawing 
Generalisations 
Based on patterns of 
affiliation and similarity 
or difference 
Aid the negotiation of a historicity already constituted 
through narrativisation and analogy drawing 
 
 
Table 6. Three modes of history-production (Source: Author’s own) 
 
These metaphors of anchor and compass encapsulate two basic functions for 
the past in relation to crisis. As ‘compass’ the past provides practical assistance in the 
form of guidance, direction, or counsel. In such instances, the historical record can 
guide agents in their attempts to negotiate the dilemmas posed by a moment of 
apparent crisis. But regardless of who may be seeking it, such guidance necessarily 
relies on first having established what the dilemmas posed by a crisis actually are. As 
‘anchor’ the past can do this by providing the basis for narrative understandings of the 
present-as-history. Here past crises are made to reveal either the process of history or 
the kind of present it has produced. It is on this basis that practical guidance can then 
be sought regarding how such a present might be negotiated or learnt from. Taken 
together these points highlight a complex interaction not only between historical 
analogies, lessons and narratives, but also between these representational modes and 
the discursive production or negotiation of crisis.  
 
 
 
  
 
META-HISTORY AND CRISIS IN CONTEMPORARY IPE 
 
What does this new line of crisis thinking mean for scholarship on crisis within IPE? In 
this final section I would like to highlight the methodological implications of reframing 
crises as meta-historical phenomena. There are two points worth stressing. The first is 
that the approach developed here can help to further advance empirical research on 
crisis within the constructivist and cultural political economy traditions. I illustrate this 
through a series of concrete examples drawn from elite discourse on the ‘subprime 
crisis’. The second key point is that such an approach undermines the conventional 
wisdom that economic history is simply there to be used, misused, or abused by 
contemporary agents. In the place of this doxa I suggest that IPE scholars begin 
instead to ask how crisis-histories relate to the contexts in which they circulate.   
 
Elite crisis-histories during and after subprime 
 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in late 2008 has become the subject of numerous, 
competing crisis-histories.6 In their reformist variety these range from those that 
identify a crisis of confidence or liquidity, all the way through to those that diagnose a 
crisis of the financial industry and its associated modes of regulation. Critical 
alternatives typically go further, casting the undoing of global finance as a broader 
crisis of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, debt-fuelled accumulation, or neoliberal 
globalisation. This list could go on, for there are always more crisis-histories than 
there are crises. Yet neither the origins nor the productive force of these crisis-histories 
can be adequately grasped without reference to the meta-historical dimensions of 
‘crisis’ itself. In what follows I identify three different ways in which past crises were 
put to work by global policymaking elites during the period of 2007-2009. 
The first example I want to highlight is of a crisis-history that functions as a 
call to remember lessons already learnt through prior crises. During the build-up to what 
would eventually become ‘the subprime crisis’, representatives of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) repeatedly invoke the 1970s as a reminder of the rationale behind 
inflation-control. More specifically, they depict the stagflation of that decade as a 
                                                
6 In his attempt at summary Howard Davies (2010) identifies some fifty different accounts of 
financial crisis post-2008. 
  
 
threshold through which discretionary monetary policies were first discredited, and 
then replaced by the ideas and practices of independent central banking (for example, 
see Smaghi, 2008; Stark, 2008). This is a familiar rendering of the 1970s as a crisis of 
Keynesianism. Here however, that narrativisation is made to do new things through 
practices of analogical reasoning and lesson drawing. This process entails three 
distinct moves. First, the ECB returns to the 1970s and once again extracts a 
configuration of events that casts monetary stimulus as a cause for crisis. It then 
identifies a similarity between that prior period of inflation and the recent boom in 
commodity and asset prices. Finally, on the basis of this analogy, it transposes its 
causal-account of the 1970s into the present. The result is the reiteration of a pre-
constituted lesson: Never again, but especially not now, should central bankers seek to 
weather shocks or stimulate demand using monetary levers. The ECB’s appeals to the 
1970s therefore serve to constitute the present as a recurrent form of inflationary crisis, 
as well as to provide familiar guidance on the question of how to best negotiate such a 
conjuncture. 
This kind of crisis-history can be contrasted with those that serve instead as an 
invitation to learn new lessons from old crises. In its own time, the Asian crisis was 
narrated as a crisis of ‘crony capitalism’ in the region, and this narrativisation yielded 
a series of lessons about the proper sequencing of liberal reforms in statist economies 
(see Hall, 2003). In late 2007, however, officials at the US Federal Reserve begin to 
link post-crisis policies in East Asia to emergent financial excesses in North America. 
Specifically, Chairman Ben Bernanke (2007) suggests that active over-saving in post-
crisis Asia has contributed to a ‘global savings glut’, which is now fuelling a boom in 
US housing markets and the demand for mortgage-backed securities. The Asian crisis 
is therefore recast as the origin of another crisis some ten years later. This is not a 
meaning the Asian crisis could have had in its own time, and by retrofitting this onto it, 
Bernanke constitutes the present as an affiliated crisis of accumulated global 
imbalances. The result is a new configuration of events from which different sorts of 
practical lessons can be drawn, either in-and-for the present, or as a means to ward off 
another crisis in the future. John Lipsky (2009), for example, uses Bernanke’s account 
to underline the need for his organisation – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – 
to provide viable alternatives to self-insurance for developing countries. The Federal 
Reserve therefore re-narrativises the Asian crisis in such a way that challenges existing 
  
 
crisis-histories, and invites new lessons to be drawn from both that prior episode and 
the later crisis to which it is now linked. 
Finally, there are those crisis-histories that provide grounds upon which to 
identify the lessons that are being learnt, regardless of whether these lessons are old or new. 
Crisis-histories of this kind proliferate during early 2009, when ‘green shoots’ of 
recovery prompt policymakers to seek out the sources of their apparent success. 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, for example – then Managing Director of the IMF – 
repeatedly presents ongoing efforts at crisis management as an evolution of the 
multilateral project that began after the Great Depression (as in Strauss-Kahn, 2009a: 
Section I; 2009b: Section II). Here prior narrativisations of that event as the birth of 
multilateralism are extended to cover subsequent changes in the form and content of 
international cooperation, including the rise of the G20 and the normalisation of 
central bank liquidity swaps. The result is a narrative account of the very process 
through which lessons are drawn and learnt. This kind of crisis-history serves a crucial 
legitimating function, for by framing their efforts as part of a broader history of crisis 
management, policymakers effectively narrate their own progress in drawing and 
learning lessons from the past.7 Without such a meta-narrative, the entire enterprise of 
crisis management would be stripped of its claim to objectivity and shown for what it 
is – a practical, and fundamentally imaginative task of thinking historically. 
 
On the uses of history in IPE 
 
If global policymaking elites cannot do without past crises, then what are we IPE 
scholars to make of their appeals to them? I have already suggested that the process of 
invoking past crises can be understood as a means by which agents imagine and 
respond to the dilemmas of their present. This is a logical extension of the new 
constructivist and cultural political economy approaches to crisis. Before concluding, 
however, I would like to highlight how such an insight complicates the meaning and 
place of history within IPE scholarship more broadly. In particular, I want to call into 
question the assumption that history itself furnishes lessons that agents then simply use, 
misuse, or abuse. 
                                                
7  I discuss this at length in a forthcoming article entitled ‘Conjuring the Spirit of 
Multilateralism: Histories of Crisis Management During the Great Credit Crash’. 
  
 
 For many in IPE, to be historical is to delve back into the archives and 
uncover the truth of the past. This view reflects IPE’s troubled relationship with 
economic history. Take for example the case of hegemonic stability theory (HST). 
Although inspired by the work of a financial historian, proponents of HST took 
Charles Kindleberger’s (1973) account of the interwar years and transformed it into a 
set of broader claims about the patterns and logics of the international system. 
Kindleberger (1986) soon distanced himself from these claims, and a prominent 
monetary historian – Barry Eichengreen (1992) – explicitly criticised what he saw as a 
preoccupation with the concept of hegemonic leadership (see Oliver, 2009: 282-83). 
In response, self-consciously historical IPE has become more closely aligned with 
economic history – either by drawing on the findings of historians, or by producing 
primary historical research of its own (cf. Walter, 1993; Germann, 2014). 
The problem, however, is that economic history provides a very narrow lens 
through which to analyse the social function of the past. In his new book Hall of 
Mirrors, Eichengreen (2015: 14) explicitly addresses how the “experience of the Great 
Depression … shaped perceptions and reactions to the Great Recession”. His basic 
argument is that while some useful lessons were drawn from the interwar years, others 
were looked over, distorted, or misused by agents who – for one reason or another – 
could not return to the past without reading it wrong. But how exactly are 
contemporary agents to tell whether they are reading history in the right way? Past 
events, structures, or processes become histories only through narrativisation, and 
there is always more than one way of narrativising the past. This means that the 
‘lessons of the past’ can and indeed must change with the histories from which they 
are drawn. Such lessons are therefore the very terrain of interpretive struggle over 
history, rather than an authority that enables us to distinguish between right and 
wrong versions of it. From the perspective of historical IPE, this suggests clear limits to 
the use of methodologies drawn from economic history.  
Economic history, however, need not monopolise historical research in IPE. 
As Ronen Palan (2009: 392) points out, the so-called British school has always been 
more historical than its American counterpart, and it has done this by stressing the 
status of each present as a unique or specific context for social practice. Such an 
approach has much to recommend itself when it comes to analysing the social 
function of the past. If all conjunctures are shot-through with questions about what is 
  
 
happening, what is possible, and what is desirable, then imagined histories – whether 
or not these are histories of crisis – can be understood as ‘reflective’ devices that agents 
develop and deploy to understand the contexts in which they find themselves (Amoore 
et al., 2000: 60-66). On this view, taking history seriously means situating acts of 
historical imagination at the very interface of structure and agency.  
From the perspective of the new crisis theory, this approach highlights an 
important question – namely, how do subjective interventions relate to the objective 
complexity that produces uncertainty and necessitates an exercise of the historical 
imagination in the first place? What, we must still ask, is “the context of expressive 
struggle” over past crises (Widmaier et al., 2007: 756), and how does this context 
inform the recollection of past crises and production of crisis-histories? Are past crises 
simply used and abused to suit the purposes of those that invoke them? In order to 
answer these questions researchers will need to be attentive to how different agents 
develop and deploy their crisis-histories.  
Take for example the elite discourse on financial crisis discussed in the 
previous section. Financial elites inhabit a very particular milieu within the world 
economy, and there are a host of other agents involved in imagining financial crises, 
ranging from politicians and public intellectuals to civil society activists and radical 
anti-capitalists. In these latter instances, crises may be imagined through recourse to 
an altogether different repertoire of past events and historical narratives. They may 
also be imagined as events that call for an end to the practice of crisis management as 
such. Taking the historical imagination seriously will therefore require that scholars 
treat imagined crises as situated forces of history-production. Methodologically 
speaking, this implies a focus not only on the representational modes employed by 
different agents, but also on the repertoire of past crises that they draw from, and the 
specific contexts or milieus in which they put these to work. Whose crisis-histories will 
prove to be path-shaping, however, is ultimately an empirical question. There may 
always be more crisis-histories than there are crises, but all crises are traversed 
through discursive struggles over the past. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this article I have sought to deepen the theoretical basis for crisis theorising in IPE. 
I have done this by returning to a longer history of crisis thinking in the human 
sciences. Within this broader tradition, the concept of crisis appears first and foremost 
as a means of exercising the historical imagination. Each theory of crisis specifies a 
different relation between crisis and history, and at least in principle, there is no limit 
to ways in which theorists can imagine this relation. Crisis thinking in political 
economy is a case in point. As an objective event, ‘crisis’ can signal a singular shock or 
a periodic process of adjustment; it can express a long-term tendency or its eventual 
culmination; it can even mark a transition between different institutional logics 
altogether. As a subjective process there is important variation too: on one hand, it 
can connote a profound uncertainty regarding the causes behind such events, on the 
other, a fundamental inability to determine which diagnosis will eventually prove to 
be path-shaping.  
With the new constructivist and cultural political economy, these ambiguities 
are radically foregrounded through an attempt to turn the idea of crisis into a tool for 
analysing how events are construed and constructed as crises. After all, if a crisis is 
created and traversed through its recognition as one, then its nature and significance 
becomes dependent on the form given to it by the agents of history. The implication 
of this, I argue, is that theory must turn its attention to how agents themselves might 
generate and act upon imagined crisis-histories. To this end I propose a novel set of 
tools for crisis theorising in IPE. The first of these is an analytical distinction between 
different practices of historical representation and the functions they are capable of 
performing. The latter depend on the former but they cannot be reduced to them. 
The second tool is a typology that distinguishes between representations of the past 
produced through practices of analogical reasoning, narrativisation, and lesson 
drawing. Past crises relayed through these practices feed into the production and 
negotiation of crisis episodes in distinct ways. Finally, my third contribution is concept 
of ‘history-production’, which captures how past crises can serve as both anchor and 
compass in the search for appropriate responses to crisis. Together these tools enable 
some important clarifications regarding the meta-historical dimensions of crisis.  
  
 
The first of these regards the immediately practical functions of recollected 
crises. Within the new crisis theory, debates over past crises are linked to the 
identification of appropriate responses to a crisis in the present. They are also seen as 
capable of legislating against particular kinds of crisis response. Both are plausible 
possibilities, but each process relies on a complex procedure of lesson drawing. In 
order to even formulate a lesson, agents must identify similarities between two or 
more crises, transpose a causal account of the past into the present, and infer from this 
the likely consequences of a particular course of action. Interpretive struggles over 
which are the ‘right’ lessons to learn are similarly grounded in the procedures of 
narrativisation and analogical reasoning, for it these that enable projected 
consequences to be imagined and appraised. Any analysis of how debates over the 
past might shape the negotiation of crisis episodes in the present must be attuned to 
this. 
A second point is that past crises can perform practical functions in the future. 
Some crisis narratives refuse to die and live on long after they are first articulated. The 
same goes for the lessons that such narratives underpin. All efforts to learn from past 
crises are set against a repertoire of lessons drawn during prior episodes of crisis. This 
repertoire can be returned to and raided like a storehouse of practical manuals for the 
negotiation of crisis episodes. Yet it can also be added to through the drawing of new 
lessons. Such lessons can be drawn either during or after crisis episodes, and they are 
bequeathed to the future as a resource for facing crises to come. This too is an 
important practical function for the past that cannot be understood without reference 
to the interpretive procedures on which it depends.  
A third and final point is that the recollection of past crises can have a function 
that goes beyond the mere provision of practical guidance, policy-related or otherwise. 
This stems from the centrality of narrative representation to the practice of lesson 
drawing. In order to draw a new lesson or adjudicate between existing ones, crisis 
narratives are needed. Yet these narratives do not produce themselves; they are 
produced through procedures of narrativisation. Narrativisation in this way performs 
a preliminary and more fundamental function, which is to render history itself 
intelligible. Competing crisis narratives may disclose different and contradictory 
histories, but without them past crises cannot even begin to provide agents with more 
practical forms of guidance. The upshot, then, is that crises are always and 
  
 
everywhere meta-historical. They are produced through an exercise of the historical 
imagination, and it is this same basic capacity that is called upon in efforts to manage 
or negotiate them. The tools developed here provide constructivist and cultural 
political economy scholars with a means of better engaging these meta-historical 
dimensions of crisis. 
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